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Traded corporations are required by law to have a majority of out-
side directors on their board. This requirement allows the existence
of directors who sit on the board of two or more corporations at
the same time, generating what is commonly known as interlocking
directorates. While research has shown that networks of interlock-
ing directorates facilitate the transmission of information between
corporations, little is known about the extent to which such inter-
locking networks can explain the fluctuations of stock price returns.
Yet, this is a special concern since the risk of amplifying stock fluc-
tuations is latent. To answer this question, here we analyze the
board composition, traders’ perception, and stock performance of
more than 1500 US traded corporations from 2007-2011. First, we
find that the fewer degrees of separation between two corporations
in the interlocking network, the stronger the temporal correlation
between their stock price returns. Second, we find that the cen-
trality of traded corporations in the interlocking network correlates
with the frequency at which financial traders talk about such cor-
porations, and this frequency is in turn proportional to the corre-
sponding traded volume. Third, we show that the centrality of cor-
porations was negatively associated with their stock performance
in 2008, the year of the big financial crash. These results suggest
that the strategic decisions made by interlocking directorates are
strongly followed by stock analysts and have the potential to cor-
relate and amplify the movement of stock prices during financial
crashes. These results may have relevant implications for scholars,
investors, and regulators.
Keywords: stock market, corporate governance, interlocking networks, information
transmission, financial traders
1 Introduction
According to corporate governance standards in the US (1), traded corporations are re-
quired to have a minimum of three directors in their board and a majority of outside
directors (2, 3). Typically, these outside directors either have their primary affiliation
with a different corporation, are self-employed, or retired (2). This allows a director to sit
on the board of two or more corporations at the same time—including or not their own
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affiliation board, generating what is commonly known as interlocking directorates (2–5).
In turn, interlocking networks emerge as the result of many interconnected interlocking
directorates (2,3). Indeed, interlocking networks have been the focus of numerous research
analyzing their role in the performance of corporations, organizational failure, economic
downturns, hegemony, CEO pay, the sale price of a corporation, stock synchronicity, and
prices for a corporation’s services, among others (2,3,6–10). Yet, the strongest consensus
so far is that interlocking networks mainly favor the transmission of information among
corporations (3,5,11). For instance, this information advantage has been observed when
central corporations of interlocking networks can adopt new market strategies quicker via
information they gather from their interlocking directorates (12,13).
A major question that remains to be answered is whether interlocking networks can
affect market processes (3). Board members are typically major stockholders and report
financial strategies to their investors (2, 3). Indeed, previous work has suggested that
interlocking directorates may play an important role in the information gathered by stock
analysts, especially when there is substantial media coverage (14). This is a special con-
cern of regulators since the risk of amplifying stock fluctuations is latent (2, 3). In fact,
this question has motivated important actions in the US Congress dating back to the
early 1900’s (2). Section 8 of the Clayton Act explicitly prohibited interlocks if the linked
corporations would violate antitrust laws if combined into a single corporation (2,4). Over
the years, these actions have promoted a decrease in the number of interlocking direc-
torates, especially within the financial sector (3). However, even with these limitations, it
has been shown that financial shocks can be transmitted across the interlocking network
regardless of the degrees of separation between corporations (2,3,15–17).
To shed new light on the above question, we study the extent to which interlocking
networks can explain stock fluctuations. We analyze data on the board composition,
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traders’ perception, and stock performance of more than 1500 US traded corporations (see
Appendix for further details). To capture the behavior of interlocking networks across a
variety of financial periods, we focus our analysis on the period covered by the big 2008
financial crash and its pre and post financial periods. We use the data extracted from
RiskMetrics (18), which is a yearly compilation from 2007-2011 of the board composition
of over 1500 large US traded corporations. Daily closing stock prices for these corporations
are extracted from WRDS database (19), and stocks are categorized in a market sector
according to Yahoo Finance criteria (20). We analyze traders’ perception on these traded
corporations using trading data and electronic communication among traders from one
US trading firm for the period 2007-2009 (21, 22). Here, we explore the extent to which
interlocking networks can explain stock correlations, the plausible mechanisms linking
interlocking networks and stock markets, and the potential effect of such associations.
2 Results
2.1 Network characterization
We constructed interlocking networks for each year from 2007-2011 formed only by the
traded corporations observed in a particular year. A link between two corporations is
established if they share at least one board member in the same year. Consistent with
previous studies and regulations (2, 3), we find that the observed boards in these inter-
locking networks have a median size of 9 directors, of which the majority are outside
directors (> 50%). The 99% of the observed interlocking directorates (i.e., links between
two corporations) share only one board member. In total, there is approximately 20% of
corporations who do not share any single director with another corporation, whereas the
other 80% are on average 4.6 interlocking directorates apart from each other. Interest-
ingly, 85% of all interlocking directorates are formed between corporations that belong to
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different market sectors, and we find no significant connectivity differences across mar-
ket sectors. These results are also in agreement with the characterization of interlocking
networks found in previous studies (16,17).
Whereas the characterization of the interlocking network remains fairly constant across
the observation period, the financial market exhibited important fluctuations from year
to year. In 2007, 46% of the 1422 observed traded corporations increased their stock price
by the end of the year. In contrast, in 2008, the year of the big financial crash, only 12%
of the 1453 observed traded corporations increased their stock price. This was followed
by a recovery period in 2009 and 2010 were 81% of 1357 and 1413 observed corporations
increased their stock price, respectively. Finally, in 2011, the market had a relatively bad
period with 41% of 1447 observed corporations increasing their stock price. Therefore,
these data bring us the opportunity to investigate the association between interlocking
networks and stock fluctuations across different financial periods.
2.2 Interlocking networks and stock correlations
To study whether stock correlations can follow a characteristic pattern among inter-
locking directorates, we measure the association between network proximity—degrees of
separation—and market similarity—temporal correlation of stock prices—among traded
corporations (Fig. 1). It was previously shown that the synchronicity between two stocks
can increase if these two corporations share a director (10). Here, we expand on this
question to ask whether traded corporations that are closer in the interlocking network
also have a stronger correlation between their stocks. For each year, we define a matrix
of network proximity D of size N × N , where N is the number of observed traded cor-
porations in a year, Dij = 1/(dij), and dij is the degree of separation (number of links)
between corporation i and j in the interlocking network. Note that the degree of sepa-
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ration of a corporation to itself is dii = 0, and unconnected corporations have an infinite
degree of separation (dij = ∞). The greater Dij, the higher the proximity between the
two corporations in the interlocking network. Note that our matrix of network proximity
takes into account all pairs of traded corporations.
Additionally, we define a matrix of market similarity S = 1
M−1RR
T of size N × N ,
where M is the total number of trading days in a year, and Rik = (zik − 〈zik〉)/σzik
is the standard deviation normalized daily log returns of stock i in day k such that
zik = log(pi(k)/pi(k − 1)) and pi(k) is the closing stock price of corporation i in day k.
Therefore, the matrix of market similarity S corresponds to the correlation matrix ΣR
of R (23). The higher Sij, the higher the similarity or temporal correlation of the stock
price movements of corporation i and j in the year.
We calculate partial Mantel correlations (24) (both Spearman and Pearson correla-
tions) between the matrices of network proximity and market similarity while controlling
for other proximity matrices given by market sector, geographic distance, board size, frac-
tion of directors with financial expertise, and average stock price in the year (see Appendix
for further details). Following previous studies (25–29), we use the average stock price in
the year as surrogate of firm size given its relevance and undisputed effect on the analysis
of stock fluctuations. We also divide our analysis into the biggest market sectors (Ba-
sic Materials, Consumer Goods, Financial, Health Care, Industrial Goods, Services, and
Technology), where sector matrices are simply sub-matrices of the full proximity matrices
composed of corporations from a single sector.
Importantly, we find positive correlations between network proximity and market sim-
ilarity in both individual sectors and in the market as a whole (i.e., taking all sectors
together). Figure 2 shows that the majority (23 out of 35, P = 0.024, binomial test)
of partial Mantel correlations yield positive correlations with 95% bootstrap confidence
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intervals (solid circles). These correlations hold to additional non-parametric statisti-
cal tests (see Appendix). While the correlations found have relatively small values (the
largest is 0.4), let us not forget that even small changes in the price of stocks can generate
big losses or gains in the market (22, 30). Moreover, these correlation values are larger
than the values generated if we only focus on distances dij = 1 (see Appendix), following
previous work (10). Interestingly, we can also observe that not all sector behave in the
same way. For instance, the interlocking networks of the healthcare and industrial sectors
can explain more clearly the stock correlations among their constituent traded corpora-
tions than the consumer or financial sector. We can also see that some sectors, such as
the financial or technological sector, change from negligible (positive) correlations at the
beginning of the observational period to positive (negligible) correlations by the end of
the period. We leave future explanations of these changes to the reader.
To further support the validity of the correlations between network proximity and
market similarity, we test whether corporations that increase or decrease their network
proximity from one year to the next one also increase or decrease their market similarity
accordingly. In specific, for each year from 2008-2011, we calculate a new matrix of
network proximity given by the difference between the network proximity between two
corporations in a given year Dij(t) and their network proximity in the previous year
Dij(t − 1) (only taking into account those corporations that are present in both years).
Similarly, we generate a new matrix of market similarity for each year from 2008-2011,
in which the new elements of each of these matrices are given by the difference between
the market similarity between two corporations in a given year Sij(t) and their market
similarity in the previous year Sij(t−1). Finally, for each year, we measure the correlation
between the newly generated matrices of network proximity and market similarity.
Figure 2 (green/Y region) shows that the new correlations between proximity changes
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are, in fact, equivalent to the positive correlations in each year. Overall, these findings
reveal that changes in the degree of separation between two corporations in the inter-
locking network are correlated with changes in their stock correlations. If the degree of
separation decreases, the stock correlation increases, and vice versa.
2.3 Interlocking networks and stock markets
To unveil potential mechanisms explaining the previous association between stock corre-
lations and interlocking networks, we study the behavior of one the main financial actors
towards interlocking directorates. In specific, we analyze the perception and informa-
tion gathered by stock analysts on traded corporations and whether this is associated
with their trading activity. As proxy for the information collected by stock analysts, we
use trading data and the electronic communication among a group of financial traders
from a US trading company from 2007-2009 (see Appendix). Previous work has revealed
that traders are constantly tracking business press coverage of traded corporations and
exchanging this information among their peers (21). An illustrative example of this in-
formation concerning corporate directorates is the following message between two traders
on July 7th 2008: “Microsoft willing to enter talks if Yahoo elects new board.” In fact, it
has been shown that traders’ communications can signal their understanding of market
volatility (21,22). Therefore, this suggests that the more strategic decisions made by in-
terlocking directorates, the higher the chances that there is a media coverage of relevance
to traders, and the higher the potential that this correlates with their trading activity.
To test the above hypothesis, for each year from 2007-2009, we investigate the associ-
ation of the frequency at which traders talk about traded corporations with the centrality
in the interlocking network and the traded volume of such corporations. The frequency is
calculated by the total number of times a ticker (e.g. GOOG as for Google) is mentioned
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over the entire year by this group of traders. We measure a corporation’s centrality by
〈Di〉 = 1N−1
∑
j Dij, where Dij is the network proximity between two corporations, as
mentioned above. We find that similar results are obtained if we replace 〈Di〉 by other
centrality measures, such as the total number of interlocking directors or the community
participation coefficient (31). The traded volume is calculated by the total amount of US
dollars traded by this group of traders over the entire year.
Figure 3 shows indeed a positive association (partial Spearman rank correlation) of
ticker mentions with both the centrality and traded volume of corporations, controlling
for the average stock price, board size, and fraction of financial experts in the board.
Interestingly, we find negligible associations (partial Spearman rank correlation) between
centrality and traded volume, controlling for ticker mentions, the average stock price,
board size, and fraction of financial experts in the board. This supports the hypothesis
of a path going from interlocking directorates to traders reacting to information and then
to trading activity. Overall, these findings show an enhanced attention of stock analysts
to central corporations in interlocking networks.
2.4 Exposure to market fluctuations in interlocking networks
Finally, to test the extent to which interlocking networks can amplify the exposure of
traded corporations to market fluctuations, we compare the centrality of corporations
in the interlocking network with their stock performance over the year. The centrality
of a corporations is again measured by 〈Di〉. We measure a corporation’s short-term
and long-term stock performance by its beta (βi) and its yearly stock price return (ri),
respectively.
The commonly known beta of a stock is given by βi = Cov(zi, zb)/Var(zb), where zi
and zb are the daily log returns of stocks i and the benchmark return, respectively (see
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Appendix). The higher (lower) the beta, the more the stock moves in the same (opposite)
direction and farther apart from the benchmark return. This means that during good or
bad market periods, the short-term stock performance of a traded corporation increases
the higher or the lower the beta of the stock, respectively. The yearly stock price return
is given by ri = log(pi(tf )/pi(to)), where pi(to) and pi(tf ) are the daily closing stock
prices of corporation i at the beginning and at the end of the calendar year, respectively.
The higher the yearly return, the better the long-term stock performance of a traded
corporation. For each year from 2007-2011, we measure the effect of centrality on the
short-term and long-term stock performance using a multivariate linear regression model
controlling for the corporations’ individual characteristics (see Appendix).
In general, Figure 4 shows that the centrality of traded corporations has negligible
effects on their long-term and short-term stock performance (but see the Financial sector).
This is in line with our previous findings showing that interlocking networks favor stock
correlations and, in turn, this may explain why interlocking networks have no effect on
pushing traded corporations away from the general market trend. However, Figure 4 also
reveals that during 2008, the year of the big financial crash, there is a negative effect
between centrality and long-term stock performance. These results suggest that during
financial crashes, interlocking networks can amplify the exposure of traded corporations
to market fluctuations.
3 Discussion
US governance standards favor the participation of outside directors in corporate boards,
which in turn allows the creation of interlocking directorates. While direct competitors
are prohibited to create interlocking directorates, these corporations have on average
only four degrees of separation. The financial sector is a good example of this market
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environment. There is almost no interlocking directorate between financial corporations,
but they are indirectly linked by their interlocking directors sitting on the board of a
third corporation belonging to a different market sector. Indeed, as we mentioned before,
85% of interlocking directorates are formed between corporations belonging to different
market sectors. While interlocking networks facilitate the transmission of information, it
has been unclear whether they can also explain stock fluctuations in the financial market.
Our findings have shown that interlocking directorates seem to be one of the factors
favoring the existence of stock correlations. We acknowledge that other confounding fac-
tors can explain stock correlations. Interestingly, a potential mechanism explaining the
link between interlocking networks and stock markets appears to be the enhanced at-
tention of stock analysts to central corporations. It remains to be seen whether other
measures of centrality can provide better insights about these associations. Importantly,
because interlocking networks may amplify market fluctuations during financial crashes,
future work should also explore the impact of the different dynamics found across mar-
ket sectors. Importantly, it does not escape our notice that these results provide valuable
non-opinionated insight for scholars, regulators, investors, and board members themselves.
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Figure 1: Illustrative example of interlocking directorates. The green and blue traded corpora-
tions are linked by their inside/outside director that sits on their board. The question is whether
traded corporations that are closer in the interlocking network also have a stronger correlation
between their stocks.
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Figure 2: Interlocking networks and stock correlations. Spearman partial Mantel correlations
(Pearson correlations yield similar results) between the matrices of network proximity and mar-
ket similarity of traded corporations in each year. The red/solid line corresponds to the calcu-
lated correlation for all traded corporations regardless of market sector. Circles correspond to
correlations in a particular market sector. Solid symbols correspond to correlations that do not
cross zero using bootstrap 95% confidence intervals (error bars). We focus on the seven major
sectors: (B) basic materials, (C) consumer goods, (F) financial, (H) healthcare, (I) industrial,
(S) services, and (T) technology. The Y column in 2008-2011 corresponds to the correlation
between changes in network proximity and changes in market similarity for all pairs of traded
corporations in reference to their values in the previous year.
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Figure 3: Interlocking networks and stock markets. For each year from 2007-2009, the figure
shows Spearman rank correlations (Pearson correlations yield similar results) between tickers’
mentions and the centrality of such corporations in the interlocking network. Similarly, the
figure shows Spearman rank correlations (Pearson correlations yield similar results) between
tickers’ mentions and the traded volume of such corporations by the same group of traders over
the entire year.
17
2007
Sc
al
ed
 e
ffe
ct
 o
f
ce
n
tra
lit
y 
on
 s
ho
rt−
te
rm
st
oc
k 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
B C F H I S T
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
2008
B C F H I S T
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
2009
B C F H I S T
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
2010
B C F H I S T
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
2011
B C F H I S T
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Sc
al
ed
 e
ffe
ct
 o
f
ce
n
tra
lit
y 
on
 lo
ng
−t
er
m
st
oc
k 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
B C F H I S T
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
B C F H I S T
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
B C F H I S T
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
B C F H I S T
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
B C F H I S T
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Figure 4: Exposure of traded corporations to market fluctuations. The first row corresponds to
the scaled effect of centrality of traded corporations on their short-term stock performance—beta
of stocks. The second row corresponds to the scaled effect of centrality of traded corporations on
their long-term stock performance—yearly log returns of stocks. The red/solid line corresponds
to the effect when taking into account all traded corporations regardless of market sector. Circles
correspond to effects in a particular market sector. Solid symbols correspond to effects that do
not cross zero using bootstrap 95% confidence intervals (error bars). We focus on the seven major
sectors: (B) basic materials, (C) consumer goods, (F) financial, (H) healthcare, (I) industrial,
(S) services, and (T) technology.
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Appendix
Board composition data. We use the data extracted from RiskMetrics (18), which
is a yearly compilation from 2007-2011 of the board composition of over 1500 large US
traded corporations. We use only those traded corporation on which we could find stock
price information in our stock price data. Board members were manually disambiguated
using gender, age, and affiliation data provided by RiskMetrics. These data also have
information of whether a board member is consider a financial expert by the traded cor-
poration. In some cases, the same board member is classified as a financial member in one
corporations but a non-financial expert in a second corporation. We decided to classify
board members as financial experts if they are considered to be experts at least in one
corporation. The board composition and their financial expertise for each year is provided
in an additional file.
Stock price data. Daily closing stock prices from 2007-2011 for these corporations are
extracted from WRDS database (19), and stocks are categorized in a market sector ac-
cording to Yahoo Finance criteria (20). The stock data and market classification for each
year is provided in an additional file.
Traders data. Our data includes the full population of more than 3 million instant mes-
sages sent/received and more than 1 million of trading decisions of day traders at a typical
small-to-medium sized US trading company from 2007-2009. All trading related data was
automatically captured by the company’s trading system, which is specially designed for
accuracy in recording, and used by most other companies in the industry. The study
conforms to Institutional Review Board (IRB) criteria. There was no subject interaction,
all data was 100% archival, and the company and the subjects were anonymized. Legally,
all data used in the study is owned by the company. All traders at the company know the
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company owns the data and that their communications and trading behavior is recorded
by law. We received written permission from the company to use these data for research
purposes and publishing contingent on identifying characteristics of the company and its
traders remaining confidential and anonymous. For further details see Refs. (21,22). We
use only those tickers that we were able to disambiguate across traders’ communications.
Tickers’ mentions and traded volume are normalized (to preserve the company’s confi-
dentiality) and provided in an additional file.
Control proximity matrices. Partial Mantel correlations between network proxim-
ity and market similarity are controlled by proximity in market sector F , average stock
price in the year T , board size B, fraction of directors with financial expertise E, and
geographic distance G. The proximity matrix F corresponds to Fi,j = 1 if traded corpo-
ration i and j belong to the same sector, 0 otherwise. In the rest of the control proximity
matrices, the elements (i, j) of these matrices correspond to the inverse of the normal-
ized absolute differences between the value measured in corporation i and j, such that
higher values always represent corporations with higher proximity. For proximity matrix
T , Tij = (max{k1} − k1ij)/(max{k1} − min{k1}) where k1ij = |〈log(pi)〉 − 〈log(pj)〉|
and 〈log(pi)〉 is the average log price of stock i over the year. For proximity matrix B,
Bij = (max{k2} − k2ij)/(max{k2} −min{k2}) where k2ij = |bi − bj| and bi is the total
number of board members of traded corporation i over the year. For proximity matrix
E, Eij = (max{k3} − k3ij)/(max{k3} − min{k3}) where k3ij = |ei − ej| and ei is the
fraction of board members with financial expertise of traded corporation i over the year.
For proximity matrix G, Gij = (max{k4} − k4ij)/(max{k4} − min{k4}) where k4ij is
the geographic distance between corporation i and j as function of their geographic co-
ordinates latitude and longitude extracted from their zip codes. Zip codes were collected
from Yahoo Finance and from HighBeam.Com. These data are provided in an additional
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file. We find a majority of negligible associations of market similarity with the control
proximity matrices of firm size, board size, fraction of financial experts in the board, and
geographic distance (see Additional Figs. S1-S4).
Robustness of correlations between network proximity and market similarity.
We find that each of the positive correlations shown in Figure 2 is also higher than the
expected correlation between network proximity and market similarity when we randomly
generate new matrices of network proximity (see Additional Fig. S5). These new matrices
are generated by bootstrapping elements with replacement from the original matrices of
network proximity. Additionally, the observed correlations between network proximity
and market similarity shown in Fig. 2 cannot be reproduced if we disconnect boards (i.e.,
dij =∞) when a certain degree of separation has been exceed (see Additional Fig. S6).
Benchmark return. To calculate the benchmark return, we use the average daily log
returns zb = 〈zi〉 of all the observed corporations. For individual market sectors, we did
not find statistical differences if we use 〈zi〉 or the the average daily stock returns only of
corporations from individual market sectors. The distribution of betas and yearly stock
returns are shown in Additional Fig. S7.
Multivariate linear regression model The model is defined by performancei ∼ 〈Di〉+
〈log(pi)〉 + bi + fi + i. The response variable performance can take either the beta of
the stock βi or the yearly stock return ri. We control for the average price of the stocks
in the year (〈log(pi)〉), the size of the boards (bi), the fraction of directors with financial
expertise in each board (fi), and the Gaussian noise (i). We scale all predictor variables
to be able to compare their effect. The model has a goodness-of-fit of R2 ∼ 0.3 for all
years. Interestingly, the control variables board size and fraction of directors with financial
expertise show a majority of negligible effects, while firm size yields positive and negative
effects for short-term and long-term stock performance (see Additional Figs. S8-S10).
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Mantel correlation This correlation is the extension of the standard Pearson or Spear-
man rank correlation to dyadic data (24). Mantel correlation works as follows, let us
assume that we have two sets of n objects represented by their similarity matrices Xij
and Yij, i.e., dyadic data. For example in our case, network proximity and market simi-
larity. The Pearson Mantel correlation coefficient is computed as
r =
∑
i>j(Xij − X¯)(Yij − Y¯ )∑
i>j(Xij − X¯)2
∑
i>j(Yij − Y¯ )2
where X¯ = 2
n(n−1)
∑
i>j Xij is the average Xij value (similarly for Y¯ ). Note that the sum
is only made on the strictly upper triangular part of the matrices. This is so because
similarity matrices are symmetric and have their diagonal elements equal to one. For
the Spearman rank Mantel correlation, we first substitute the elements of the matrices
Xij and Yij by their respective rank. In a similar way we can compute partial Mantel
correlations (32). To compute the 95% confidence interval of the correlation coefficient, we
use a bootstrap procedure (33). We re-sample simultaneously the rows and the columns
of the similarity matrices, and then for each re-sampling we compute again the Mantel
correlation coefficient. The re-sampling procedure results in the empirical distribution of
the Mantel correlation coefficient, from which we extract the 95% confidence interval.
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